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Supreme Court and thus remains unanswered.
When interpleader is used to protect the insurer from multiple liability,
his duty to defend should continue until judgments are rendered in the
amount of the policy coverage. Thus, the insured would still receive the
benefits of his insurance contract, and the insurer would still be protected
against a multiplicity of suits by judgment creditors of the insured. More
importantly, the intended purposes of the interpleader statute would be
furthered: the race to judgment aspects of mass torts would be diminished
and the judgment creditors of the insured would receive a non-discrim-
inatory pro rata distribution of the insurance proceeds.
T. Winston Weeks
Full Faith and Credit - Procedural Limitation Bars Sister
State's Collateral Attack on Jurisdiction
Jeff Burleson filed for divorce from Mary Burleson in Harris County,
Texas. Later, but before the Texas suit could come to trial, Mary filed suit
for divorce in Nevada, alleging that she had been a bona fide resident of
that state for the requisite six-week period Jeff was personally served in
Houston, pursuant to the Nevada long-arm statute.! He filed no answer
and made no appearance in the Nevada proceeding, and a default judgment
granting Mary a divorce was rendered in Nevada. The judgment specifical-
ly recited that Mary Burleson had been a bona fide resident of Nevada for
a period of six weeks before filing suit.
In the Texas action, Mary filed an amended answer setting up the Ne-
vada decree as a defense, but Jeff attacked the validity of the Nevada di-
vorce, alleging that the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction because Mary
never intended to become a bona fide resident of Nevada. Mary argued that
Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b)2 foreclosed such an attack in Texas
because: (1) rule 60(b) limits attack for "intrinsic fraud" to within six
months of the judgment; (2) the Nevada Supreme Court has defined "in-
trinsic fraud" as including an attack based on fradulent domicile;' (3)
more than six months had passed since Mary's Nevada divorce decree; and
(4) the full faith and credit clause5 requires the Texas court to apply the
maximum policy coverage. The insurer then has a duty to pay judgment creditors up to the policy
limits, and this is accomplished in the interpleader action.
NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.020 (1967) in part provides:
2. Unless the cause of action shall have accrued within the county while plaintiff and
defendant were actually domiciled therein, no court shall have jurisdiction to grant
a divorce unless either the plaintiff or defendant shall have been resident of the
state for a period of no less than 6 weeks preceding the commencement of the
action.
2NEV. R. Civ. P. 4(2).
a Id. 60 (b).4 Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019 (1962).
'U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964), in part, provides: "Such act, records
and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
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six months proscription of rule 60 (b). Upon a finding that Mary Burleson
was not a bona fide resident of Nevada,' the trial judge declared that the
Nevada divorce was ineffective for want of jurisdiction by the Nevada
court and that the parties were still husband and wife. Held, reversed: A
procedural rule placing a six-month limitation upon a collateral attack for
intrinsic fraud bars an examination of the jurisdictional fact issue of resi-
dence' in the courts of a sister state. Burleson v. Burleson, 419 S.W.2d 412
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
I. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND DIVORCE JURISDICTION
The United States Constitution requires that the states give "full faith
and credit" to judgments of sister-state courts.! However, as the courts
have construed this clause, full faith and credit applies only when the
jurisdiction of the rendering court is unimpeachable.! Because jurisdiction
is always open to attack, the application of full faith and credit to divorce,
an area of the law with confused jurisdictional concepts, presents some
extremely complex problems.
Divorce Jurisdiction in General. The courts have considered divorce juris-
diction in terms of both of the traditional types of actions, in rem and in
personam.' The earliest approach was the in rem theory, typified by the
case of Ditson v. Ditson.5 ' There the court concluded that the wife's domi-
cile in Rhode Island gave that state sufficient interest in the marital rela-
tionship to grant a divorce even though the husband received no notice
or service. The marital relationship-brought to Rhode Island by the wife's
status as a domiciliary--constituted the res necessary to confer jurisdiction.
60 On appeal, Mary Burleson conceded the sufficiency of the evidence to support this finding.
However, she contended, and the court agreed, that the evidence would have supported a contrary
finding also. Residence was defined by the Nevada Supreme Court in Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421,
65 P.2d 872, 875 (1937): "[I]t was necessary for plaintiff to convince the jury that his physical
presence in this state for the whole statutory period preceding and including the date of com-
mencement of this action was accompanied by the intent to make Nevada his home, and to remain
here permanently, or at least for an indefinite time." (Emphasis added.)
The intent to make the forum state the home of the party distinguishes domicile from resi-
dence; the latter is characterized by mere physical presence. One may have at any given moment
several states of residence, but only one of domicile-that residence which he subjectively intends to
make his permanent home.
'The court apparently uses "residence" in the sense meant by the Nevada statutes as inter-
preted in Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d 873, 875 (1937). See note 6 supra.
6 See note 5 supra.
0 During the early nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court applied the full faith
and credit clause quite literally, without any qualifications. See Mills v. Duryee, 12 U.S. (7 Cranch)
481 (1813). The judgment of one state was conclusively valid when considered by the courts of
a sister state. The Court, however, enunciated in Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457
(1873), the view that obtains today. In that case the Court said that jurisdiction is always open
to inquiry, and only when jurisdiction is unimpeachable does full faith and credit apply. Subse-
quent treatment of the clause may be summed up in the words of Chief Justice Stone in Pink
v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941), that "the full faith and credit clause
is not an inexorable and unqualified command." Clearly, jurisdiction is a prerequisite to full faith
and credit.
"0 In rem jurisdiction is obtained by the presence of the res (the marital relationship) within
the forum state. In personam jurisdiction is obtained by personal service or appearance. See White
v. Glover, 138 App. Div. 797, 123 N.Y.S. 482 (1910), aff'g 116 N.Y.S. 1059 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
"54 R.I. 87 (1856). See also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Alton v. Alton,
207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Later courts, however, moved away from the the in rem concept. In Felt v.
Felt"5 it was held that a foreign divorce decree was entitled to full faith and
credit in New Jersey only if substituted service had been made on the de-
fendant. Under this view, notice, but not actual service within the ren-
dering state, was a requisite to divorce jurisdiction."
The treatment of divorce as an in personam matter apparently arose
with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Haddock v. Had-
dock." In that case the Court held that New York was not required to rec-
ognize a divorce granted to a husband domiciled in Connecticut, because
the wife's domicile and the last matrimonial domicile were in New York
and the wife had not been within the personal jurisdiction of the Con-
necticut court.
However, in Williams v. North Carolina" the United States Supreme
Court overruled Haddock and returned to the in rem theory. In Williams
the husband left North Carolina, the matrimonial domicile, and went to
Nevada where he stayed the requisite six weeks and obtained an ex parte
divorce. His wife was not served in Nevada and did not appear in the
suit. Williams remarried in Nevada, and upon his return to North Carolina
was convicted of bigamous cohabitation, with North Carolina simply re-
fusing to recognize the Nevada divorce decree." The United States Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that since the husband, under Nevada law,
was apparently a domiciliary 7 of that state when the decree was granted,
the divorce was equally binding on the wife. In the Court's view, the dom-
icile of the husband created the res necessary to give Nevada jurisdiction
over the divorce action.
Domicile as a Requisite for Divorce Jurisdiction. Williams was retried
in North Carolina for bigamous cohabitation, and this time the state at-
tacked the jurisdiction of the Nevada court on the ground that Williams
was, in fact, not a domiciliary of that state. In affirming the North Car-
olina conviction, the United States Supreme Court held that, because Ne-
vada law required domicile as a jurisdictional element," the jurisdiction of
the Nevada court was open to attack in North Carolina."
Although this second Williams case remains the touchstone in the area
of divorce jurisdiction, there is still some question as to whether domicile
is actually required for extra-territorial validity, absent any state law re-
quiring it." In dicta the Williams majority noted that "under our system
of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-
"2 59 N.J. Eq. 606, 45 A. 105 (Ct. Err. & App. 1899).
" This case has been characterized as quasi in personam. G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CON-
FLICT OF LAwS 294 (3d ed. 1963).
'4201 U.S. 562 (1906).
1"317 U.S. 287 (1942).
"State v. Williams, 220 N.C. 445, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941), revl, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
1 Domicile had not been contested by North Carolina.
s Domicile is the jurisdictional fact as required by Nevada law. See note 6 supra.
"OWilliams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
"Id. at 244 (dissenting opinion). In Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903), the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a South Dakota divorce holding that, regardless of the South
Dakota requirements for residence, domicile in that state was essential to grant a divorce with
cxtra-territorial effect and that the appearance of both parties was insufficient to confer jurisdiction
[Vol. 22
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is founded on domicile." 1 Later, in Alton v. Alton, " the Third Circuit
struck down a Virgin Islands statute which eliminated the requirement of
domicile, observing that "domestic relations are a matter of concern to the
state where a person is domiciled."'
In contrast to the federal judiciary, state courts have been less insistent
upon domicile as an element of jurisdiction, particularly with regard to
servicemen's divorce statutes. Although these statutes, which require only
residence, have never been tested before the United States Supreme Court,
they are generally considered to be valid.' The highest courts of several
states, including Texas,2 have upheld them.'m The New Mexico Supreme
Court's statement in Wallace v. Wallace" is indicative of the state court
position:
Where domicile is a statutory jurisdictional prerequisite it is quite correct
to say that jurisdiction for divorce is founded on this concept. It is quite
another matter to flatly declare that there may be no other relationship
between a state and an individual which will create sufficient interest in the
over the subject matter when it was wanting for lack of domicile. Andrews appears to require
domicile, but the impact of the case was lessened when Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906),
was decided three years later. Also, the Andrews case would be decided differently today because
the wife appeared and contested jurisdiction, and under the doctrine enunciated in Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1947), res judicata would preclude such an attack. See note 21 inf ra. As to
whether domicile is required, see also Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 678 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting
opinion); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1958).
As pointed out in the Alton dissenting opinion and in Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Over-
ruled?, 18 IND. L.J. 165 (1943), domicile as the basis of divorce jurisdiction was evidently a
creation of nineteenth century judges who accepted Dean Storey's view expressed in J. STOREY,
COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 228 (1834). The continental requirement of nationality
for divorce jurisdiction clearly would not work in the United States, since divorce was a state, not
a federal, matter. Storey's view that only the courts where the parties lived had jurisdiction won
widespread general support. For a somewhat different view, see Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity
Between Due Process and Full Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 CoLuM.
L. REV. 1363 (1967).
" Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). The federal courts have often re-
solved the full faith and credit and jurisdictional problem as it pertains to divorce through the
application of the principle of res judicata. That is, if both parties have been given full opportunity
to litigate the issue of jurisdiction, then the matter becomes res judicata and cannot serve as the
basis of a collateral attack in another state. In Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1947), the United
States Supreme Court articulated three criteria which determine when res judicata applies. Where
there has been (1) participation by the defendant, (2) full opportunity to litigate the issue of
jurisdiction, and (3) where the decree cannot be attacked in the courts of the rendering state,
res judicata bars a collateral attack in a sister state. See also Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951)
(collateral attack would be allowed where the defendant spouse had neither been served nor ap-
peared in the rendering state); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948) (defendant's collateral attack on
jurisdiction barred because of his participation in the divorce proceeding); Davis v. Davis, 305
U.S. 59 (1938) (where the defendant contests the issue of domicile in a divorce proceeding, the
issue will be res judicata); cf. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
22207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
22 There was, however, a very strong dissent in this case.
24 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Reporter's Note § 72, comment c at 275
(Proposed Official Draft 1967); Comment, The Serviceman's Dilemma: Divorce Without Domicile,
13 Sw. L.J. 233 (1959).
21 Wood v. Wood, 149 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
2SLauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alas. 1964); Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 175 Kan. 629,
266 P.2d 282 (1954); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958). Significantly,
all but one of the states having servicemen's divorce statutes require one year's residence. Oklahoma
requires six months. Obviously the period required creates substantially greater interest in the state
than the six-weeks "domicile" required by Nevada. Still, the above decisions upholding such statutes
are solely concerned with the state's power to grant a divorce with internal validity, with only
passing attention paid to the extra-territorial effect.
2' 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
state under the due process clause to give the power to decree divorces.28
However, such views are by no means universal. In Jennings v. Jennings"
the Alabama Supreme Court held that the legislature did not have the
power to do away with the domicile requirement.
Texas Treatment of Foreign Divorces. Texas courts have approached the
problem of foreign judgments with a view consistent with that of the
United States Supreme Court in the second Williams case. Since 18 55, col-
lateral attacks on foreign divorces have been allowed on the basis of an
examination for jurisdiction."° Typical of the numerous Texas cases in
point is Burk- v. Burk." There the husband, as a defense to his wife's di-
vorce action, argued that his prior Nevada divorce was entitled to full
faith and credit. The court summed up the Texas view when it said that
the husband's divorce "fell among that well-marked class of such proceed-
ings which may be attacked collaterally, by showing that the court issuing
them had no jurisdiction, notwithstanding the full faith and credit
clause."'a
Callicoate v. Callicoate,a cited in the Burleson opinion, is implied au-
thority for the proposition that a foreign divorce may be attacked in Texas
on the ground that the divorcing spouse was not a domiciliary of the state
granting the divorce. There one spouse obtained a Nevada divorce and the
decree specifically recited that she had been a resident of Nevada for six
weeks, although this in fact was not true. Three years later, the husband
attacked the Nevada divorce, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Nevada
court. The court in Callicoate refused to give full faith and credit to the
Nevada decision because of lack of jurisdiction, presumably because it
found that the wife was not a domiciliary of Nevada.
II. BURLESON v. BURLESON
In Burleson v. Burleson' the issue of the application of full faith and
credit to the ex parte divorce was clouded by the Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reasoned that since Nevada
Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) foreclosed attack upon a judgment for in-
trinsic fraud, and Nevada defined intrinsic fraud as including fraudulent
domicile, the Nevada divorce was not subject to examination for jurisdic-
tion in Texas. As authority, the court cited two Texas cases." In Marsh v.
Millward" Millward sued in Texas on a Colorado default judgment. Marsh
28 320 P.2d at 1022.
2251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948).
s°Chunn v. Gray, 51 Tex. 112 (1879); Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Tex. 551 (1859); Norwood v.
Cobb, 15 Tex. 500 (1855); Reed v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 409, 187 S.W.2d 660 (1944); Callicoate
v. Callicoate, 324 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e.; Carr v. Carr, 279 S.W.2d 146
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Burk v. Burk, 25"5 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); In re Keen's
Estate, 77 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Richmond v. Sangster, 217 S.W. 723 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919), error ref.; Givens v. Givens, 195 S.W. 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Stuart v. Cole,
92 S.W. 1040 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906); Morgan v. Morgan, 21 S.W. 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892).
a' 255 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
' id. at 910.
33324 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), error ref. n.r.e.
24419 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
sO'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966); Marsh v. Millward, 381 S.W.2d 110
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref. n.r.e.
S8 381 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref. n.r.e.
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had been personally served in the Colorado suit but defended the Texas ac-
tion on the ground that his attorneys did not notify him as to the time and
place of the final Colorado hearing. However, Colorado Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure limit a motion to set aside a judgment for fraud to within six
months of the date of the judgment, and the Texas court correctly ruled
that the Colorado judgment could not be attacked in Texas when more
than six months had elapsed. But in Marsh there was no issue of jurisdic-
tion. Marsh had been personally served within Colorado, so the Colorado
court, unlike the Nevada court in Burleson, had jurisdiction over both the
person and the subject matter. Only then did full faith and credit come
into play. 7
O'Brien v. Lanpar,s the other decision cited by the Burleson court, was
a Texas suit on a personal money judgment rendered in Illinois against a
Texas resident. There the issues were whether the Illinois long arm statute
was constitutional, 9 and whether the defendant's contacts with the forum
state were sufficient to meet due process standards under the "minimum
contacts" doctrine. "' The Supreme Court of Texas correctly stated that the
law of Illinois and not Texas law was in point.
In Burleson the court, following O'Brien, concluded that the law of Ne-
vada was in point. However, the Nevada law the court should have been
concerned with was not the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure but the
statutory and case law establishing domicile as the basis of jurisdiction for
divorce.
Much can be read into the Burleson court's failure to allow an examina-
tion for jurisdiction. The case could mean that a judgment that cannot be
attacked in the rendering state cannot be attacked in Texas, even on jur-
isdictional grounds. This is surely contrary to the United States Supreme
Court's view of the full faith and credit clause "1 and is opposed to previ-
ous Texas case law.- Alternatively, Burleson could mean that domicile is
not a jurisdictional fact issue in divorce cases. However, this is not likely
for two reasons. First, the opinion indicates that the court did not clearly
see this issue.' Secondly, the court in fact did not have the option to hold
that domicile was not a jurisdictional fact issue, because the Nevada Su-
preme Court has expressly held that the residence required by statute for
divorce jurisdiction is the equivalent of domicile." Thus, if Mary Burleson
was not a bona fide resident (domiciliary) of Nevada, that state could not
have rendered a divorce with even internal validity. With this fact in
mind, the apparent nonavailability of a remedy in Nevada, upon which the
Burleson decision turned, was actually of no moment. The Burleson court
"'Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873). See note 9 supra.
38399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
"'VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 173, 178
(1968).
40 Id.
41 Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
4 See cases cited note 30 supra.
4' The court writes in terms of intrinsic fraud, as distinguished from jurisdiction. Burleson v.
Burleson, 419 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
44 See note 6 sujsra.
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allowed a procedural rule to cut off a collateral attack on jurisdiction,
when, in fact, the rendering state may not have had jurisdiction.' Thus,
Burleson harks back to the literal interpretation given to the full faith and
credit clause over a century ago."
Burleson, however, offered some extenuating circumstances which might
have influenced the decision. Mary Burleson had remarried six months
after the Nevada divorce, and Jeff Burleson died before the Texas case went
up on appeal. The court might have been reluctant to reach a decision
which would have tainted Mary Burleson's second marriage when the op-
posing party had no further interest in her marital status."'
III. CONCLUSION
Since the Burleson court failed to treat the issue of whether domicile is
constitutionally required for extra-territorial validity of divorce decrees,
this question remains unanswered. In the second Williams case the United
States Supreme Court flatly stated, in dicta, that domicile is the basis of
jurisdiction for divorce."0 However, the Restatement view is that other jur-
isdictional bases, such as residence by a spouse for one year in the divorce
state, will suffice for full faith and credit purposes.""
With the divorce rate continuing to rise and the increased mobility of
American society, this area of the law should be relieved of unnecessary
confusion and uncertainty. Clearly, the highly subjective concept of dom-
icile as a jurisdictional basis is of little value in this regard." A much more
workable and equitable principle might be the concept of "substantial in-
terest" by the rendering state.' Substantial interest would follow physical
habitation in the forum state of a minimum duration, i.e., one year. Only
decrees rendered by a state having substantial interest in one of the parties
would be entitled to extra-territorial validity. One writer has suggested
that this be accomplished by a federal proviso to the full faith and credit
implementing statute." This would eliminate "quickie" divorces, or at least
deny them extra-territorial recognition, while sanctioning divorces that are
now unnecessarily suspect. A person would not be likely to spend one year
in another state solely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce on grounds
not available in his home state. Even if he did, the resident state would have
4d.
'Mills v. Duryee, 12 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813). See note 9 supra.
4'Brief for Appellee at 6, Burleson v. Burleson, 419 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967):
"[T]he propriety of the Trial Court's judgment in this case is a matter of concern only for
Appellant."
.s Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). "Under our system of law, judicial power
to grant a divorce-jurisdiction strictly speaking-is founded on domicile." Id. at 229.
'ORESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, Reporter's Note § 72c, at 275 (Proposed
Official Draft 1967).5 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 244 (1945) (dissenting opinion). "The Con-
stitution does not mention domicile. Nowhere does it posit the powers of the state or the nation
upon that amorphous, highly variable common-law conception. Judges have imported it. The im-
portation, it should be clear by now, has failed in creating a workable constitutional criterion in
this delicate region." Id. at 255.
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, Reporter's Note S 72c, at 275 (Proposed
Official Draft 1967).
" Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity between Due Process and Full Faith and Credit: The
Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1967).
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sufficient interest in him to have the power of adjudicating his marital
status. Such a move would eliminate much of the sham now surrounding
ex parte divorces and would allow the courts to resolve equitably any con-
flicts in traditional legal terms.
W. T. Minick
Mental Suffering - Texas Stands Firm - No "New" Tort
Plaintiff Fisher entered the dining club of the defendant Carrousel Mo-
tor Hotel for a luncheon engagement. As he entered the serving line and
picked up his plate, defendant's manager approached Fisher and snatched
the plate from his hands. The manager informed Fisher in a loud and of-
fensive manner that Fisher could not be served in the club because he was
a Negro. Fisher brought an action for assault,' seeking special damages for
the great humiliation and indignity' allegedly suffered as a result of the
manager's conduct. The court of civil appeals, affirming the trial court,
held that as a matter of law no assault had been committed and that absent
a physical touching, assault, or resulting physical injury, Fisher could not
recover for embarrassment or humiliation.' Held, reversed and rendered:
Snatching an article from the hands of another is sufficient invasion of the
inviolability of the person to constitute a battery4 and entitles the plaintiff
to compensation' for the mental disturbance inflicted upon him as a result
of such invasion. Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627
(Tex. 1967).
' Fisher brought an action for assault in the trial court and appealed on the theory that the
trial court was in error for not finding as a matter of law that an assault had been committed.
The supreme court found no assault, but held that a battery had been committed.
'Fisher testified that he suffered no fear or apprehension.
3Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'A battery is the use of any unlawful violence on the person of another with the intent to
injure him, whatever the means or degree of violence used. The action of battery protects the rights
of each individual to be free of intentional and unpermitted physical contact, and the element of
personal dignity involved allows compensation for trivial contacts which do no physical harm but
are offensive or insulting. Knocking or snatching anything from the plaintiff's hand or touching
anything connected with his person when done in a rude or insolent manner is sufficient to con-
stitute a battery. To be a battery, the touching must be offensive to an ordinary person and not
one unduly sensitive about his personal dignity. The normal person is said to consent to the usual
and common touchings encountered in everyday activities. See Schmitt v. Kurrus, 234 Ill. 578, 85
N.E. 261 (1908); Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 1 So. 2d 510 (1941); Tsx. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 1138 (1953); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §5 18, 19 (1964).
If a battery has been committed and defendant can show no defense or privilege, plaintiff
is at least entitled to nominal damages for the infraction of a legal right. Compensatory damages
can be recovered for any injury directly flowing from the battery on the plaintiff. Exemplary or
punitive damages are allowed for a battery committed wantonly, maliciously, or under circum-
stances of aggravation and are awarded to punish defendant for his wrongful act and to deter
others from committing the same type of unpermitted invasion of plaintiff's right. See Miller v.
Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948); McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal. App. 2d 249,
171 P.2d 85 (1946); Kast v. Link, 90 Neb. 25, 132 N.W. 717 (1911); Walker v. L.B. Price
Mercantile Co., 203 N.C. 511, 166 S.E. 391 (1932); Texas Coal & Fuel Co. v. Arenstein, 55
S.W. 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900). See generally C. McCoRMIcsc, DAMAGES § 81 (1935).
